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DOES CENTRAL RANX INTERVENTION
INCREASE THE VOLATILITY OF
FOREIGN EXCHANGE RATES?
ABSTRACT
Sincethe abandonment of the Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates in the
early 1970s, exchange rates have displayed a surprisingly high degree of time-conditional
volatility. This volatility can be explained statistically using autoregressive conditional
heteroscedasticity models, but there remains the question of the economic source of this
volatility. Central bank intervention policy may provide part of the explanation. Previous
work has shown that central banks have relied heavily on intervention policy to influence the
level of exchange rates, and that these operations have, at times, been effective. This paper
investigates whether central bank interventions have also influenced the variance of exchange
rates, The results from daily and weekly GARCH models of the $/DM and $/Yen rates over
the period 1985 to 1991 indicate that publicly known Fed intervention generally decreased
volatility over the full period. Further, results indicate that intervention need not be publicly
known for it to influence the conditional variance of exchange rate changes. Secret
intervention operations by both the Fed and the Bundesbank generally increased exchange
rate volatility over the period.
Kathryn M. Dominguex




and NBER'The past has shown us that whenever the finance ministers from the
Big Five get together there's a lot of rhetoric and little action. Any
time there's talk of intervention and outside forces in the market, it
creates volatility and uncertainty. But in the long term it doesn't have
any lasting impact,' The Watt Street Journal, 9123/85.
I.Introduction
Foreign exchange intervention operations are a controversial policy
option for central banks. In one view, exemplified by the quote.
intervention policy is not only ineffective in influencing the level of the
exchange rate, but also dangerous1 because it can increase the volatility of the
rate. Others argue that intervention operations can influence the level of the
exchange rate, and can also "calm disorderly markets', thereby decreasing
volatility. Yet others argue that intervention operations are inconsequential,
since they neither affect the level nor the volatility of exchange rates. There
are a number of empirical studies that examine whether intervention operations
affect the level of exchange rates,' but little has been written on the effects of
intervention on the variance of rates.2 This paper examines the effect of
intervention on foreign exchange rate volatility over the period 1985 through
1991.
Jurgenson (1983), Loopesko (1984), Obstfeld (1990), Dominguez
(1990a,b, 1992), Dominguez and Franket (1993a,b,c) and see the references
in Edison (1993).
2 Anotable exception is Baillie and Humpage (1992). Lastrapes (1989)
examines the effects of U.S. monetary policy on the volatility of exchange
rates.
IDuring the period in. which countries adhered to the Bretton Woods
exchange rate system, intervention operations were required whenever rates
exceeded their parity bands. After the breakdown of the system in 1973,
intervention policy was left to the discretion of individualcountries. It was not
until 1977 that the IMF Executive Board provided its member countries three
guiding principles for intervention policy: (1) countries should not manipulate
exchange rates in order to prevent balance of payments adjustment or to gain
unfair competitive advantage over others; (2) countries should intervene to
counter disorderly market conditions; and (3) countries should take into
account the exchange rate interests of others.3 These principles implicitly
assume that intervention policy can effectively influence exchange rates, and
explicitly state that countries should use intervention policy to decrease foreign
exchange rate volatility.
After actively engaging in foreign exchange intervention in the 1970s,
the U.S. abandoned intervention policy altogether during theperiod 1981
through 1984. In early 1985, after the dollar had appreciated by over 40%
against the mark, and the U.S. trade deficit was nearing $100 billion, the U.S.
joined with the German Bundesbank and the Bank of Japan to intervene against
the dollar. In the autumn of 1985 the U.S. and the rest of the G-5engaged
in an unprecedented number of large and coordinated interventionoperations
IMF executive Board Decision no. 5392-(77f63), adopted April 1977.
2as part of the Plaza Agreement. The C-S continued to intervene episodically
throughout the rest of the 19 SOs.
The scale of central bank intervention operations has been large in the
post-1985 period relative to that in the early 1980s, but small relative to the
overall size of the foreign exchange market. The New York Fed reports that
the average daily volume of foreign exchange trading was $192 billion
(eliminating double-counting) in the United States in April 1992. By
comparison the average coordinated intervention operation during the late
1980s involved $350 million.4 Figures 1 and 2 present bar graphs of U.S.
and German intervention operations in the 1980s.' The Bundesbank has
maintained the most consistent presence of the 0-5 countries in the foreign
exchange markets. The Bundesbank intervened steadily during the period
before 1985 when the Fed was absent from the market. Germany was
reported to have been the major initial force in starting the dollar on its decline
in early 1985 through both its own intervention operations and its pressure on
the U.S. and Japan to join in coordinated operations.
The average coordinated sale of dollars by the Fed and the Bundesbank
over the period 1985 through 1988 involved $350 million, and the average
coordinated purchase of dollars by the two central banks involved $368
million.
$TheBundesbanic intervention data used in this paper end in December
















































































































































































































































































































 Did the G-5interventionoperations, over the period 1985 through
1991, influence the volatility of the $/DM or the $/Yen exchange rates?
Section ii begins with a discussion of how central bank intervention policy can
influence exchange rate first moments. Section IH presents daily and weekly
models of exchange rate changes that allow intervention operations to influence
both the conditional mean and variance. Estimates of the models are presented
in section IV. Section V presents conclusions. Overall, the econometric
results indicate that official exchange rate policy often significantly influenced
exchange rate volatility.
TI. Can Central Bank Jntervention Influence Exchange Rates?
Foreign exchange market intervention is, most broadly defined, any
transaction or announcement by an official agent of a government that is
intended to influence the value of an exchange rate. In most countries,
intervention operations are implemented by the monetary authority, although
the decision to intervene can often also be made by authorities in the finance
ministry, or treasury department depending on the country. In practice,
central banks define intervention more narrowly as any official sale or
purchase of foreign assets against domes tic assets in the foreign exchange
market.
Although each central bank has its own particular set of practices,
intervention operations generally take place in the broker's market. During
major intervention episodes, the Fed often chooses to deal directly with the
4foreign exchange desk of several large commercial banks simultaneously to
achieve maximum visibility. As with any other foreign exchange transaction,
trades are officially anonymous. However, most central banks have developed
relationships with traders which allow them to inform the market of their
presence within minutes of the original transaction.6
Data on daily official central bank purchases and sales in the foreign
exchange market have rarely been made available to researchers outside the
central banks,7 let alone market participants. Although intervention data have
not been published on a daily basis by the central banks,8 daily intervention
operations are frequently reported in newspapers and over the wire services.
So, although current official data are unavailable, there exist numerous
unofficial sources of the data. The Appendix to Dominguez and Frankel
(1993c) provides a listing of all the news of intervention activity (as well as
more general exchange rate policy announcements) by central banks reported
in the Wall Street Journal, the London Financial Times and the New York
Times over the period 1982 through 1990. Non-reported interventions are not
6
Dominguezand Frankel (1993c) provide a detailed description of this
process.
'
Exceptionsinclude Neumann (1984), Dominguez (1990a,b, 1992) and
Dominguez and Frankel (1993a,b,c) who were given access to Bundesbank
intervention data. There were even fewer exceptions in the case of Federal
Reserve Data prior to 1991.
The daily U.S. data is now available with a one year lag.
Sdifferentiated in central banks' official data, but one can roughly infer which
operations were secret by comparing the official data with published reports
of intervention activity in the financial press. Although traders may sometimes
know that central banks are intervening without such knowledge appearing in
the financial press, this relatively conservative accounting for reported
intervention reveals that the bulk of recent intervention is not secret. In the
empirical tests described in the next section 1 distinguish "secret" and
"reported" interventions to examine whether the distinction matters in the
volatility regressions.
Regardless of whether interventions are made public, intervention
operations may influence
-
thedomestic monetary base. Nonsterilized
intervention operations involve a change in the domestic monetary base; they
are analogous to open-market operations except that foreign, rather than
domestic, assets are bought or sold. Sterilized operations involve an offsetting
domestic asset transaction that restores the original size of the monetary base.
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York is thought to fully and automatically
sterilize its intervention operations on a daily basis. In practice, the foreign
exchange trading room immediately reports its dollar sales to the open market
trading room, which then sells enough bonds to leave the daily U.S. money
supply unaffected. The Bundesbank also claims to sterilize their foreign
6exchange intervention operations routinely as a technical matter.9
Nevertheless, the general perception is that both the Fed and the Eundesbank
have at times allowed intervention operations to influencemonetary
aggregates. Although the degree of monetary accommodation is limited to the
extent that they both target their money supply growth.
The standard monetary approach to exchange rate determination
indicates that nonsterilized intervention will affect the level of the exchange
rate in proportion to the change in the relative supplies of domestic and foreign
money, just as any other form of monetary policy does. The effects of
sterilized intervention are less direct and more controversial. In portfolio-
balance models of exchange rate determination investors diversifst their
holdings among domestic and foreign assets based both on expected returns
and on the variance in returns. According to the theory, as long-asforeign
and domestic assets are considered outside assets and are imperfect substitutes
for each other in investor's portfolios, an intervention that changes the relative
outstanding supply of domestic assets will require a change in expected relative
returns. 10 This is likely to result in a change in the exchange rate.
See Neumann and von Hagen (1991) for a detailed discussion of
German sterilization policy.
°Bransonand Henderson (1985) provide a survey and analysis of
portfolio balance models.
7The second channel through which sterilized intervention can affect
the level of exchange ratesis known as the signalling channel.'1
Intervention operations affect exchange rates through the signalling channel
when they are used by central banks as a means of conveying (or signalling),
to the market, inside information -informationknown to central banks but not
the market -aboutfuture fundamentals. If market participants believe the
central bank intervention signals, then even though today's fundamentals do
not change when interventions occur, expectations of future fundamentals will
change. When the market revises its expectations of future fundamentals, it
also revises its expectations of the future spot exchange rate, which brings
about a change in the current rate. The magnitude of the signalling effect of
a sterilized intervention operation may exceed that of a nonsterilized operation,
depending on the magnitude of the future change in monetary policy that the
signal conveys.
Is there empirical evidence that intervention operations affect the level
of exchange rates?In 1982 the G-7 economic summit at Versailles
commissioned a comprehensive study of intervention policy in order to answer
this question. The (3-7 working group report, completed in 1983, draws no
firm conclusions, but suggests that the effects of sterilized interventions on the
exchange rate were (at most) small and transitory over the period 1973-198!
"Oneof the first descriptions of the signalling channel can be found in
Mussa (1981).
8(Jurgenson 1983, Henderson and Sampson 1983). Studies of intervention
policy in the 1980s suggest that more recent operations may have been more
effective.'2in particular, these studies find that intervention had a
statistically significant effect on exchange rates over the period 1985-1988
through both the portfolio balance and signalling channels, but that only the
signalling channel effect was economically significant.Moreover, the
evidence suggests that coordinated intervention operations were more effective
than unilateral operations."
III. A Model of Daily and Weekly Exchange Rate Behavior
It is standard to model exchange rates as forward looking processes
that are expectationally efficient with respect to public information. The
current spot rate can be represented as
12 For example, Dominguez (1990a,b), Black (1992), Catte, Galli and
Rebeccheni (1992), Ghosh (1992) and Dominguez and Frankel (1993a,b,c).
However, Humpage (1989) finds little evidence of a statistical relationship
between intervention and exchange rates over this period.
"Loopesko (1984) also finds this to be the case in the late 1970s.
9= (1)
where ; is the current spot exchange rate (domestic currency per unit of
foreign currency) in log form, 5 is the discount factor,'4is a vector of
exogenous driving variables, and f1 is the public information set at time t. If
intervention operations, denoted I,, provide relevant information to the market,
then they will enlarge the market's information set (0, C0+I)and
influence the spot exchange rate, For example, if a central bank intervention
in support of the domestic currency signals future contractionary domestic
monetary policy, the domestic currency will appreciate relative to the foreign
currency:
=(1—S) S'EI(z,+kIQ,)> (1—O) okEg(z,÷kIot+It)(2)
where, in this example, I represents an official purchase of domestic assets.
In practice, exchange rate determination models that include variables
other than the current spot rate have had limited success in explaining short-
term movements of exchange rates.'5 Daily and weekly changes in the spot
UInthe monetary approach, 5=f?/l +$, where 0isthe interest semi-
elasticity of money demand.
Meese and Rogoff (1983) and Levich (1985) provide surveys of
empirical exchange rate behavior results.
10exchange rate appear to be largely driven by unanticipated news. At the same
time, studies by Westerfield (1977) and Hsieh (1988) find evidence of
unconditional leptokurtosis in exchange rate changes. This suggests that there
exists temporal clustering in the variance of exchange rate changes: large
changes are followed by large changes, and small changes by small changes.
Hsieh (1989) and Diebold and Nerlove (1989) document that there isstrong
evidence of autoregressive conditional beteroscedasticity (ARCH) in the one
step ahead prediction errors for daily and weekly dollar exchange rates.'6
They conclude that the disturbances in the exchange rate process are
uncorrelated but not stochastically independent. This suggests that even if
short-term exchange rate changes are not predictable, the variance of exchange
rate changes may be.
if we denote the one period change in the exchange rate as i,then
an empirical model of exchange rate changes can be represented as
us,= z,(3+€, (3)
where ; includes news and intervention variables, and c1 is the disturbance
term. The conditional mean of the disturbance in (3) is E[cjR.]=0(where
now includes 'H)andthe GARCH(1, 1) conditional variance is var[c
16
Engle(1982) is the first application of ARCH to price data.
Bollerslev 's (1986) generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity
model (GARCH) extends the ARCH class of models to allow the conditional
variance of exchange rate prediction errors to depend on lagged conditional
variances as well as past sample variances.
11= var[Ls,fit_li == cx.3 +a1v1 + cv41.'1 If central bank intervention
does not signal future fundamentals, but instead is based on current movements
of the exchange rate, then E[e, Ik-1I0;will not be an appropriate right-
hand-side variable in (3). Dozninguez and Frankel (1993c) find that the
intervention operations that took place in the mid-1980s cannot be well
explained on the basis of past exchange rate movements. But this hypothesis
will be tested in the next section of the paper.
A GARCII specification of the conditional variance of the
disturbances in (3) allows foradaptivelearning by market participants; the
variability of today's exchange rate depends on past variability. Diebold and
Nerlove (1989) suggest that the nature of incoming information in asset
markets may explain this nonlinear serial dependence. When signaLs are
relatively clear (i.e. easily and unambiguously interpretable) then, conditional
upon those signals, exchange rate volatility is likely to be low. When there
is disagreement about the meaning of incoming information, or when clearly
relevant and significant information is scarce, we would expect greater market
volatility" (Diebold and Nerlove 1989,19).
A hypothesis that can be tested using the (JARCU model is that secret
interventions are inherently ambiguous signals and they are consequently more
17Theunconditional mean of the disturbance term is E[r]=O and the
unconditional variance is var[cj =var[asja01(1-a1-a2).
12likely to increase uncertainty in the market. Secret interventions are likely to
be ambiguous signals of both intervention policy andfuturefundamentals.
Reported interventions presumably provide clearer signals of intervention
policy. Chosh (1992) and Kaminsky and Lewis (1993) test whether
intervention helps forecast future monetary policy. Both studies find evidence
that knowledge of intervention policy does improve predictions of future
monetary policy.
flsieh (1988) finds evidence that both thy-of-week and holiday
dummy variables should be included as explanatory variables in daily exchange
rate GARCH models. Further, Hsieh (1989) shows that, in practice, it is
difficult to identify the correct number of lags to be included in the conditional
variance equation of a OARCH model. Bollerslev (1986), Hsieh (1989), and
Baiflie and Bollerslcv (1989) find evidence that the OARCH(1,1) using a
conditional Student : distribution, rather than the normal distribution, is the
most appropriate model for daily exchange rate data.'9I follow this
'
Kaniinskyand Lewis (1993) strongly reject the hypothesis that
intervention provides no information about future monetary policy. But they
find that subsequent monetary policy changes are frequently in the opposite
direction to what was signalled.
'Bollerslev(1986) estimates a GARCH(1,1) for daily exchange rate
observations for the period 1980 to 1985 using a conditional Student t
distribution.Baillie and Bollerslev (1989) estimate a GARCH(1,1) for daily
exchange rate observations for the period 1980 to 1985 using the Student r and
the power exponential distributions. Hsieh (1989) estimates a GARCH(1,1)for
daily exchange rate observations for the period 1974 to 1983 using the normal,
13convention and include thy-of-week and holiday dummy variables in the daily
model specification. Secret and reported intervention variables are included
separately in both the conditional mean and variance equations. In the
conditional mean equation, the intervention variables are included, so that
positive values denote purchases of dollars, and negative values denote official
dollar sales. In the conditional variance equation, intervention variables are
included in absolute value form.J also include the spread between the
German or Japanese interbank interest rate and the U.S Federal Funds rate in
both the conditional mean and variance equations to control for relative
contemporaneous monetary policies in the three countriesY The
GARCH(1, 1) models of the $IDM and $fYen exchange rates that I estimate
have the following general specification:
Student z, GED, normal-Poisson, and normal.-lognormal distributions. All
three studies found that daily exchange rate data was best modelled with the
Student tdistribution.
In the daily model the German and Japanese interest rates are the
interbank money spot offer rate (Reuters), and the U.S. interest rate is the
effective Federal Funds rate (Federal Reserve Bank of New York). The source
for these series is DRI. In the weekly model, the German data is the Repo rate
(Monthly Report of the Bundesbank), the Japanese data is the Call Money rate
(Fed H. 13 release) and the US data is the weekly average Federal Funds rate
(Federal Reserve Board).
14As, =DDE + + + + 138C1 +
13911+ 10N_1+ + + Ct
(4)
I — N(O,vn) (5)
=
a0+a1v+ + 4H, + +
+ *314-11 + *4141 + *51N,_11 +
(6)
where as1 is the log change in the 51DM or S/Yen spot exchange rate between
period t and t-1, fl1 are day of the week dummy variables (i.e., D11= 1 on
Mondays), 1it is a holiday dummy variable that is equal to one on the day
following the market being closed for any reason other than a weekend, I'j'!1
is a variable capturing reported Fed intervention operations known at time t,
I is a variable capturing reported Bundesbank intervention operations known
at time t,2' I_ is a variable capturing 'secrer Fed and Bundesbank
21Bundesbankintervention operations need not be lagged one period (as
is the case for Fed interventions) because the exchange rate data are New York
market open data and Germany is six hours ahead of New York. Market
participants cannot know (with certainty) the Fed's Tuesday interventions on
Tuesday morning (at the market opening), but the Bundesbank's operations
may be known because they will have already taken place.
15intervention operations at time t, l° is a (-1,0,1) dummy variable capturing
reported Bank of Japan intervention operations known attime t, N1 is a
(-1,0,1) dummy variable capturing exchange rate policy news (excluding
intervention), M1.1 is the spread between German or Japanese and U.S.
overnight interest rates, is the absolute value operator and ç is the
disturbance term. The conditional distribution of the disturbance term is
standardized t with variance v,anddegrees of freedom n.The:distribution
approaches a normal distribution as the parameter ii approaches infinity. The
last explanatory variable in equation (4) allows for the possibility that changes
in the conditional variance influence the conditional mean.
The GARCH models are estimated using the maximum likelihood
procedure described in Berndt, Hall, Hall and Hausman (1974). The log-
likelihood function of the data is given by:
The intervention variables are in billions of dollars ($1 billion =1).
Official BOJ daily intervention data is not available to the public. The
BOJ data used in the regressions was collected from the financial press.
Negative one denotes days in which the BOJ was reported to have intervened
against the dollar, positive one denotes days in which the BOJ was reported
to have intervened in support of the dollar, and zero denotes days in which the
BOJ was not reported to have intervened in the foreign exchange market.
24Negativeone denotes days in which an official 0-3 (the U.S., Germany
and Japan) statement was made against the dollar, positive one denotes days
in which an official G-3 statement was made in support of the dollar, and zero
denotes days in which no such announcements were made. The content of








where 1' denotes the gamma function andO=(fl,a,,).
TheFed and Bundesbank intervention data series used in the empirical
tests measure consolidated daily official foreign exchange transactions in
billions of dollars at current market values. The Fed data exclude so-called
"passive intervention operations. Passive interventions are Fed purchases and
sales of foreign currency with customers who would otherwise have dealt with
market agents? The Bundesbank data excludes non-discretionary
interventions required by EMS rules.
The exchange rate data used in the empirical tests are New York
market opening (9am EST) spot $IDM and $/Yen prices (bid side) compiled
by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York?6 Table 1 presents various
descriptive statistics for the $/DM and $/Yen rates over various subsamples
in the time period 1985 to 1991. These statistics ôonflrm that daily exchange
rates are strongly heteroscedastic martingale processes and weekly data are
25Adamsand Henderson (1983) provide detailed discussion and definition
of customer transactions.
I am grateful to Carol Osler for providing the spot data.
17weakly heterosceda.stic. These findings are consistent with the previous
literature.
The subsamples used in the empirical tests throughout the paper were
chosen on the basis of pre-announced intervention regime changes and data
availability. The first subsample includes the period January 1985 through
V
mid-February1987.During this period, which includes the Plaza
Agreement, the dollar fell by over 50% against the mark. In the early part
of subsample (1) the 0-5 central banks explicitly stated that their goal was to
depreciate the dollar. But by 1986 both the Bundesbank and the Bank of Japan
indicated -bothverbally and through their intervention operations -thatthe
dollar had fallen far enough, while the U.S. continued to 'taft" the dollar
down, but abstained from further interventions against the dollar.
Nevertheless, throughout the period the central banks' staled intention was to
affect the level rather than the variance of exchange rates. Subsample (2) is the
full sample over which the both the Bundesbank and Fed data are available,
January 1985 through December 1988. Subsample (3) covers the Post-Louvre
Accord period, February 1987 through December 1991. The G-7 (excepting
I,
Italy)produced the Louvre Accord in late February 1987 which stated that
21ThePlaza Agreement communique stated that Nviewof the present
and prospective changes in fundamentals, some orderly appreciation of the
main non-dollar currencies against the dollar is desirable. They [the Ministers
and Governors] stand ready to cooperate more closely to encourage this when
to do so would be helpful' (05 Announcement, September 22, 1985).
18nominaL exchange rates were "broadly consistent with underlying economic
fundamentals" and should be stabilized at their current levels (0-6
Communique, February 22, 1987). Subsample (4) is the full sample over
which the Fed data are available, January 1985 through December 1991.
The statistics in Table 1 indicate that skewness and kurtosis are
generally significant in the raw daily and weekly $IDM and $IYen data.
Percentage changes in both the $IDM and $/Yen spot data consistently exhibit
a high degree of kurtosis over all subsamples for all but the weekly percentage
change in the $IDMrate.The Box-Pierce Q-statistic tests for high-order serial
correlation generally indicate that the squared percentage change spot data
exhibit substantially more autocortelation than the unsquared data.' This is
indicative of strong conditional heteroscedasticity. The first four sample
autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation coefficients for the raw $/DM and
$/Yen exchange rates over the full sample period are presented in the lower
portion of Table 1; they indicate homogeneous nonstationarity. The first lag
of the sample partial autocorrelation is approximately one, and subsequent lags
are insignificantly different from zero. Standard Dickey-Fuller tests for unit
Two recent papers have examined whether dollar exchange rates in the
post-Louvre Accord period behaved as if they were in a target zone (Klein and
Lewis (1991), Baillie and Humpage (1992)),
Under the null hypothesis of iid, the Q-statistic is asymptotically a chi-
squared distribution with x degrees of freedom. The null hypothesis requires
that x increase with the sample size but at a slower rate (Hsieh, 1989, 307).
19roots fail to reject the hypothesis of a unit root in the daily and weekly spot
data over all subsamples, while the Hasza and Fuller (1979) test for two unit
roots is rejected.
IV. Estimation Results
Tables 2a through 6b present estimates from the (3ARCH(l, 1)
exchange rate model described by equations (4)-(6) over the four subperiods
using daily and weekly $IDM and $/Yen data. Table numbers with the suffix
a present the daily model estimates, and table numbers with the suffix b
present the weekly model estimates. Tables 2a and 2b present estimates of the
conditional mean equation (4) over all four subperiods. Tables 3a through 6b
present estimates from three alternative specifications of the conditional
variance equation. Each table covers one of the four subperiods. Table 7
presents results of Granger-Causality tests of the GARCH conditional variance
and the independent variables from the model.
Although the focus of this paper is the influence of exchange rate
policy on the volatility of exchange rates, it is interesting to examine the
results from the GARCH conditional mean equation. The results from the
I
dailymodel, presented in Table 2a, indicate that the day-of-the-week dummy
variables are statistically significant in samples (2) and (4) for both the $IDM
and $/Yen exchange rates. The holiday dummy variable is never statistically
significant. The coefficients on the reported intervention variables are
20generally significant. But the coefficient sign on the intervention variables is
typically positive, suggesting that on the day following a dollar supporting
intervention operation, the dollarfelt invalue. Reported Fed intervention in
'w thePlaza period, however, is significant and negative for the $/DM rate. The
coefficient on the News variable is also negative and generally highly
significant over all the subperiods. The interest rate spread variable is never
significant.The GARCI-I-in-mean term is always positive and often
significant, suggesting that higher volatility generally led to dollar depreciation
over this period. Estimates using the weekly data, presented in Table 2b,
provide similar results in terms of the signs on the coefficients. However,
particularly in the $/Yen equations, few of the coefficients in the weekly
regressions are statistically significant.
Tables 3a through 6b include three specifications of the conditional
variance equation. The first is a basic GARCH(1 , 1) model excluding the
additional exchange rate policy variables, the second is the specification
described in equation (6), and the third is a modified version of equation (6)
where the intervention variables are included as (0,1) dummy variables rather
than as magnitudes. It may be that what influences volatility is the presence
of central banks in the market, regardLess of the magnitude of the actual
intervention operation. The (lARCH model specification that includes only
dummy variables allows a test of this hypothesis.
21A number of regression diagnostics are presented at the bottom of the
tables: (in L) denotes the value of the log-likelihood function, p denotes the
number of iterations that were needed to reach model convergence, Q(x) and
Q,(x) denote the Box-Pierce Q-statistic (with x lags) for the standardized
residuals (z=c1(vJ)andthe squared standardized residuals, respectively.
According to the distributional assumptions in equation (5), the standardized
residuals should be normally distributed if the GARCII model accounts fully
for the leptokurtic unconditional distribution. The standardized residuals from
all the regression specifications over all subsamples have mean values that are
insignificantly different from zero and variance values that are approximately
equal to one. Further, the absolute size of both the Q-statistics and the
coefficients of skewness and kurtosis in the standardized residuals is generally
smaller than that of the unadjusted residuals, presented in Table I, providing
support for the GARCU models.
The estimates in Tables 3a and 3b are for the pre-Louvre Accord
subsample, January 1985 through mid-February 1987. The first three
explanatory variables included in the first and fourth columns of Table 3a are
'a
generallyhighly significant, indicating that the GARCH parameters (cv43,a1,a2)
have explanatory power in the daily model. The magnitude of the coefficient
on the lagged conditional variance, a1, is about .8 and highly significant,
indicating that the variance effect is highly persistent. In both the $/DM and
22$/Yen equations reported Fed and Bundesbank intervention are significant and
negative, indicating that intervention reduced volatility in this subperiod. In. the
$/Yen equations the interest rate spread variabLe is also significant and
negative. The distribution parameter nishighly significant and relatively
small, suggesting that the disturbances are not normally distributed.
The estimates of the distribution parameter iiinthe GARCH models
using weekly $/DM and $/Yen data were generally extremely large (greater
than 500) over all the subperiods, indicating that the disturbances from the
weekly model are approximately normally distributed. Therefore the weekly
conditional variance equations were estimated assuming normally distributed
disturbances. The log-likelihood function for the weekly GARCH(l,1) models
is given by:
T 2
L7(O)=!_!1ogv+.!L (8) T,1 2
where 8=QS,cw44').Thestandard GAItCH model using the normal
distribution contains a potentially important restriction in the conditional
variance function. Intuitively, this functional form forces larger innovations
in t1toincrease volatility at a rate proportional to the square of the size of the
innovation. Engle and Ng (1992) provide a set of diagnostics that test the
restrictions in GARtH models with normally distributed disturbances. The
row labeled E&N at the bottom of each of the tables presenting weekly results
23indicates whether any coefficient estimate from the Engle and Ng (1992)
diagnostic regression indicates that the (JARCU restrictions are violated.
In the weekly models over the pre-Louvre subperiod, the only
GARCIT parameter that is significant is the lagged conditional variance. In thet
$/DMequations the variance effect is similar in size to that in the daily model.
I,
Thevariance effect is much smaller in the weekly $fYen equations. Reported
Bundeshank intervention magnitudes are significant for both the $/DM rate and
the $/Yen rate, but the sign on the coefficient is not the same. In the $/DM
case Bundesbank intervention increased volatility and in the $/Yen case
Bundesbank intervention reduced volatility. Secret intervention is significant
for both currencies and always positive. The interest rate spread variable is
also highly significant and positive for the $/DM rate.
Tables 4a and 4b present estimates for the full period over which the
Bundesbank data is available, 1985 through 1988. The three GARCII
parameters are again highly statistically significant in the daily equations and
the daily variance effect is highly persistent. The holiday dummy variable is
now positive and significant. In the weekly tests, the size of the coefficient on
S
theconditional variance term remains high for the $/DM rate, and is about .3
for the $IYen rate. In the daily (lARCH estimates both secret intervention and
the interest rate spread variable are significant and positive for the $/DM rate.
1301 intervention is significant and positive, and Bundesbank intervention is
significant and negative for the $/Yen rate. In the weekly (lARCH estimates,
24presented in table 4b, the coefficient on publicly known Fed intervention is
negative and generally statistically significant for both currencies. This
suggests that, overall, Fed intervention that was known to market participants
decreased weekly volatility over the period 1985 through 1988. Likewise, the
coefficient on secret intervention is generally significant but positive for both
currencies. Bundesbank intervention is significant and differs in sign over the
two currencies. BOJ intervention is also significant and positive for the $/Yen
rate.
Tables Sa and Sb present estimates over the post-Louvre subsample,
starting in late Febniary 1987 through December 1991. The three GARCH
parameters and the holiday dummy variable continue to be statistically
significant over this period for the daily data.In the weekly tests the
coefficient on the conditional variance term is significant and about .8 for both
the $/DM and $IYen rates. The coefficient estimates on reported Fed
intervention and the interest rate spread variable are significant and positive
in both the daily and weekly models for the $/DM rate.Secret Fed
intervention is positive and significant in both the daily and weekly models for
both currencies. In the weekly tests BOJ intervention is generally significant
and negative for both currencies. The Engle and Ng (1992) diagnostic test
indicates that there remains positive size bias in the weekly model for the
$/DM rate. Nelson's (1991) exponential GARCH (EGARCH)modelprovides
25an alternative specification that allows large innovations to have a larger
impact on the conditional variance.3° EOARCR estimates of the conditional
variance of the $IDM rate over this period provided essentially identical results
for the parameters of interest as those reported in the tables.
Tables 6a and 6b provide the final set of conditional variance equation
estimates over the full period over which Fed data are available, 1985 through
1991. The daily CARCH parameters continue to be highly significant.
Likewise the weekly lagged conditional variance and sample variance are now
both significant. The holiday dummy is positive and always significant; the
size of the coefficient suggests that exchange rate volatility increased by
between 0.15 and 0.19 when the market reopened after a holiday. In the daily
$/DM models the interest rate spread variable is positive and significant. In the
weekly $/Yen models both BOJ intervention and the exchange rate news
variable are significantly positive. The reported Fed intervention variable is
marginally significant and negative for both currencies in both the daily and






By including the absolute value of the error term and by using logs, the
EGARCH specification allows extreme innovations to have a larger impact on
the next period conditional variance than the standard GARCFL
26weekly regressions. The average reported Fed dollar purchase and sale over
this period is $213 million, and the average sample variance of the daily
percentage change in the $/DM and $IYen rates is 0.601 and 0.472,
respectively. So the average effect of publicly known Fed intervention is to
reduce daily volatility by approximately .06 for both currencies. A similar
calculation for the weekly data suggests that reported Fed intervention reduces
weekly volatility by approximately .04.' Secret intervention is generally
significantly positive in the regressions. The average daily secret Fed dollar
purchase and sale over this period is $97 million, so the average effect of
secret Fed intervention is to increase daily volatility by approximately .02 for
the $/DM rate and .06 for the $fYen rate. On a weekly basis, secret Fed
dollar purchases and sales averaged $138 million, so the average effect of
these operations is to increase weekly volatility by approximately .03.
Overall, reported Fed intervention reduced exchange rate volatility
over the period 1985 through 1991. However, the subsample results suggest
that reported Fed intervention reduced volatility in the period 1985 through
1988 and increased volatility over the period 1989 through 1991.
Interestingly, in 1989 there is evidence from FOMC meeting minutes that it
31Theaverage reported weekly Fed purchase and sale over this period
was $500 million, and the average sample variance of the weekly percentage
change in the $/DM and $/Yen rates was 2.74 and 2.37, respectively. The
average effect of publicly known Fed intervention on volatility is: (Ov/8I)(I/v).
27was the US Treasury, and not the Fed, that dictated U.S. intervention
policy? The minutes suggest that a number of the Fed Board members were
uncomfortable with the heavy dollar selling intervention operations in 1989,
because Fed monetary policy was relatively contractionary during this period.
Governors Angell and Johnson, in particular, were concerned that the Fed was
sending the market mixed signals.33 Reported Bundesbank intervention
consistently reduced daily exchange rate volatility over the period 1985
through 1988. Reported Eundesbank intervention also reduced volatility in the
weekly $/Yen data. But Bundesbank intervention increased volatility in the
weekly $/DM rate over the period 1985 through 1988. Fed and Bundesbank
intervention operations that were not picked up by the financial press
consistently increased volatility over all the periods for both currencies. The
sign and significance of the intervention variables measured in magnitudes or
dummy variable form were quite similar. This result confirms that just the
presence of a central bank in the foreign exchange market influences volatility.
The results from the various conditional variance equations indicate
that intervention and exchange rate volatility are often correlated, but it may
n In the US, the Treasury department has official jurisdiction over foreign
exchange intervention policy. In practice the Treasury Department and the
Fed typically jointly decide when the US should be in the market, kit on
occasion a decision may be made by Treasury over the objections of the Fed.
Even though the Treasury can mandate intervention policy, it is the Federal
Reserve Bank of New York that actually implements the policy.
"Kaminskyand Lewis (1993) also make this point.
28be that volatility causes intervention, rather than the other way around. This
gets us back to the issue of whether intervention is truly an exogenous signal,
or whether it is based on past exchange rate changes. Changer's (1969)
causality regressions provide a test for this possibility. One variable (3 ranger-
causes another, if forecasts of the second variable can be improved by using
past observations of the first variable in addition to past observations of the
second variable. Tables 7a and lb present F-statistics from a series of
(hanger-causality tests using reported and secret intervention magnitudes, the
intervention dummy variables, and the news and interest rate spread variables
in separate regressions.TM The tests regress each explanatory variable on its
own past lags and past lags of the conditional variance from the GARCH
models. The null hypothesis is that all the lags of the conditional variance are
equal to zero. The F-statistics reported in the table suggest that volatility does
not Granger-cause the reported intervention variables in either magnitude or
dummy variable form. This is also the case for the news and interest rate
spread variables, However, this hypothesis is often rejected for secret Fed
intervention in subperiod (3), the post-Louvre Accord subsample. This
evidence suggests that the Fed entered the market secretly when the foreign
Alternative causality tests including a time trend and using Sims (1972)
methodology and the Geweke, Meese, and Dent (1982) serial correlation
correction provided qualitatively similar results as those presented, and are
therefore not included.
29exchange market was volatile over this period. This result will be the subject
of further investigation.
V. Conclusions
The results in the previous section suggest that exchange rate policy
variables belong in daily GARCH models of the exchange rate. Changes in
relative contemporaneous monetary policy and intervention policy were often
found to influence the conditional variance of exchange rates. Granger-.
causality tests, moreover, suggest that it is not volatility that causes
intervention. However, the tests suggest that volatility may make the Fed more
likely to keep its intervention secret.
One of the more surprising results in the paper is that intervention
need not be publicly known in order that it influence volatility. Secret
interventions were generally found to increase volatility. This result provides
evidence in support of the Diebold and Nerlove (1989) hypothesis that the
more ambiguous are signals, the higher is volatility.
The evidence provided in this paper suggests that intervention had
mixed effects on volatility. The regression estimates suggest that secret central
bank exchange rate policy did increase volatility, but secrt interventions make
up less than 20% of all intervention operations. Reported central bank
intervention over the full period generally led to a reduction in both daily and
weekly exchange rate volatility, Overall, therefore, intervention policy in the
19 SOs did not increase the volatility of foreign exchange rates.
30TADLE 1
51DM AND S/YEN EXCHANGE RATE STATISTICS
DALY__________ _________WEEKLY_________ SMPL (I) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLE:5, 9am spot5/DMexchange rate
mean 0,411 0,484 0.578 0.527 0.410 0.482 0578 0.528 variance 0.005 0.009 0.002 0.008 0.005 0.009 0.002 0.009 skewness0.0684.546" 0.542" -0.877" 0.058 -0.534"0.523"0.883' kurtosia-1.215"-1.028"-0.265t 0.053 -1.223'-1.039"-0.248 0.083
VARIABLE: 4(IoSJ daily or weekly percentagechangein the 9am spot 51DMexchangerate
mean 0.102 0.058 0.015 0.042 0.513 0.291 0.077 0.209 variance 0.783 0.599 0.518 0.601 3.428 2.665 2.446 2.748 skewness0.5784*0.449"-0.127t0.222" 0.222 0292 .0.094 0.104
Icuetosis 3.269"3362"1.448"2.627"0.355 0.6391 0.013 0.345 10 20 25 35 10 10 10 10 Q,(x) 20.442'28.043 43.714' 36.247 13.293 9.686 16.929t 16.9081 Q3,i(x) 12.54995.773" 116.461" 135.338" 5.784 14.837 17.675121 261'
VARIABLE : S 9am spot5/Yen exchange rate
mean 0.518 0.624 0.731 0.665 0.518 0.622 0.731 0.666 variance 0.009 0.019 0.002 0.014 0.009 0.018 0.002 0.013 skewness-0.025 -0.415"-0.107 -1.108" .0.015 .0.413' -0.127-I.l20' kutlosis-1.612"-1.095"-0.871"0.236' '1.618"-1.093"-0.826"0283
VARIABLE : A(lnS,) daily or weekly percentage change in the 9amspot 5/Yenexchange rate
mean 0.092 0.069 0.017 0.040 0.458 0.351 0,076 0:188 variance 0.460 0.462 0.478 0.472 2.732 2.416 2.227 2.378 skewness0.603"0.262"0.253"0.351"0.979"0.635" 0.041 0.419" kurtosis4.551"3.351"2.354"3.005" 2.603"2.208"0.610' 1.635" Qjx) 28.144"33.006'38.745* 45.651 4.918 6.897 17.1581 11 741 Qap()52.502" 9L006" l57.$3" 173.896" 9.736 13.591 14.801 20.521'
SAMPLE85-9 1
DAILY - 51DM DAILY -5/YEN WEEKLY -51DM WEEKLY -S/ YEN 0.9970810.997081 0.9973744 0.997374 0.9857226 0.985722 0.98725820.987258 0.994137 -0.005630 0.9947579 0.000408 0.9725221 0.030795 0.9743689 -0.012242 0.991186 -0.002909 0.9920568 -0.174363 0.9584551 -0.035871 0.9611085 -0.021118 0.9882960.009135 0.9893733 0.001933 0.9447408 0.003079 0.9468905 -0 034411
Theskewnessand kurtosiaatatisticaare normalizedsothat a value of 0correspondsto the normal distribution. Q.() pertainsto the Box-Pierve Q-etatiatie teat forhigh-orderaerial correlation inas; a is the number ol correlationstested. 1'denotea aigisilleance at the 90% level;•denotessignificance at the 95% level;" denotes
significance al the 99% level. Sample (1) Ia 1/85-2/87 (Pee-LouvreAccord); sample(2) is 1/85-12188; sample (3)
is 3/87-12/91 (Post-Louvre Accord); sample (4) is 1/85-12/91 (Ml sample).
31TABLE is
DAILYEXCHANGERATh GARCH MODEL: c0NDm0NAL MEAN EQUATION
=0E PDk+ff, + + + +
+ 15M- + + +
_______________3M_______________ ______________3/Yen
crap1 (I) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
abs 533 1002 1203 1745 533 1002 1208 1745
(30 -0.173 -0.212 -0.109 -0.158 -0.176 -0.177 -0.003 -0.087
(0.155) (0.143) (0.106) (0.093)t(0.088)'(0.085)'(0.068) (0.060)
0.147 0.117 0.049 0.094 0.051 0.121 0.048 0.079
(0.111) (0.065)t(0.058) (O.OSIfl (0.069)(0.053)" (0.051) (0.041)t
0.213 .0.056 0.103 0.128 0.166 0.058 0.085 0.101
(0.158) (0.131) (0.111) (0.089) (0.114) (0.116) (0.096) (0.079)
-1.522 0,077 0.327 0.354 -0.011 -0.003 0.274 0.366
(0430)" (0.046fl(0.142)'(0.191fl (0.399) (0.298)(0.115)'(0193ff
(35 0.714 1.132 0.402 0.325
(0.780) (0,405)" (0.197)'(0.274)
-0.181 1.243 1.343 1.324 0.512 0.854 1.179 1.114
(1,977) (0.605)'(0.649)'(0.600)' (1.608) (0.579) (0.676)t(0623ff
0.176 0.182 0.125 0.111 0.003 0.179 0.237 0.167
(0.121)(0.070)" (0.069)t(0.056)' (0.119) (0.072)'(0.068)" (0058ff'
-0.295 -0.213 -0.115 -0.149 -0.089 -0.145 .0,139 -0.124
(0.098)" (0.055)"(0.050)'(0.043)"(0.056)(0.045)" (0.049)" (0.037)"
-0.001 -0.004 0.004 -0.002 -0.003 0.018 0.008 0,007
(0.032) (0.026) (0.009) (0.008) (0.029) (0.016) (0.007) (0006)
02 0.196 0.342 0.174 0.205 0.313 0.388 0.030 0.152
(0.141)(0.127)" (0.144) (0.116)1'(0.108)" (0.125)"(0.100) (0.087)t
Standard errorsare in parentheses. 1' denotessignificanceat the90% level;Sdenotes signilicence at (lie95%level;
" denotessignificance atthe 99% level. Sample (1) is 1/85-2187 (Pta-Louvre Accord); sample (2) is1/85-12/88;
sample(3)is3/87-12191 (Post-Louvre Accord);sample (4)10 1/85-12/91(full sample).
32TABLE 2b
WEEKLYEXCHANGERATE GARCH MODEL: CONDITIONAL MEAN EQUATION
A; — + + 021111+PjIrlJl
+ + 5N1__5 + 6Ai1_1 + +
______________31DM______________ _____________3/Yen
amp1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
ohs 110 206 251 362 110 206 251 362
Os -0.276 0.965 1.463 -0.119 -0.735 -2.330 0,699 0.164
(0.703) (0.382)'(0.351)" (0.521) (0.828) (1.274)t (0.321)' (0.351)
-0.069 -0.139 0120 0.596 -1.608 -0.133 0.553 0.749
(0.039fl (0.480) (0.168)1 (0.283)' (4.031) (0.600) (0.304)t (0.318)'
112 3.174 2.130 1.008 1.921
(1.284)' (0.607)" (0.773) (0.829)'
115 3.000 4.451 0.323 0.753 4.104 5.077 0.128 0.843
(1.005)"(2.728)f (1.641) (1.186) (5.016) (2.939)t (1.805) (1.646)
01 -0.603 0.160 0.447 0.282 -0.801 -0.196 0.567 0.356
(0.354fl(0.208)(0.172)" (0.214) (0.576) (0.291) (0.227)'(0.191)t
-0.324 -0.703 -0.366 -0.339 -0.122 -0.279 -0.283 -0.247
(0.302)(0.164)" (0.148)'(0.138)'(0.317) (0.177) (0.165)t(0.151)
-0.160 0.329 0.121 0.028 -0.146 -0.026 -0.003 0.023
(0.208)(0.112)" (0.063)f(0.044) (0.351) (0.195) (0.043) (0.042)
13, 0.272 0.274 -0.838 0.254 0.629 1.849 -0.434 0.067
(0.327)(0.163)t(0.205)'(0.317) (0.678) (0.725)'(0.283) (0.274)
The time subscript t-j,t-1 denotes front time I-jtotime I-iwhere j=5days.Standard errors are in parentheses.
denotes significance at the 90% level; 'denotes significance at the 95%level;''denotes signilicance atthe POE
level. Sample (I) is 1/85-2/87 (Pm-Louvre Aceord); sample (2)13 1/85-12/82; sample (3) is 3/87-12/91 (Pnst
Louvre Accord); sample (4) is 1/85-12/91 (hill sample).
33TABLE 3a
DAILY EXCHANGE RATE GARCH MODELS; CONDiTIONAL VARIANCE EQUATIONS
SAMPLE; 1185-2187. 533 obs (Psv-Leuvrc Accord)
V5= a0+SIVN1+ + •1, +PLii1!fl +*31111 +
+ ipi ii,°'i + + *61511_I
________$!DM________ ________$IYEN_______
BASICMAGNJ- DUMMY BASICMAGNI- DUMMY
TUDES VARS TUbES VARS
0.071 0.016 0.027 0M28 0.002 0.021
(0.031)'(0,019) (0.024) (0.012)'(0.014) (0.018)
0.830 0.924 0S05 0.773 0.787 0.768
(0.058)" (0026)" (0.031)" (0.053)" (0.047)"(0.052)1*
02 0.086 0.035 0.054 0.172 0.146 0.129
(0.041)'(0.021)t(0.026)' (0.059)" (0.050)" (0044)"
0.050 0.171 0.074 0.201 0.123 0.121
(0.149) (0.121) (0.142) (0.120fl(0.076)(0.072)t
-0.246 -0.147 -0.586 -0.082
(0.145)t(0.081)t (0.338)f(0.059)
-0.161 -0.093 -0.274 -0.090
(0.235)(0.050)f (0.082)" (0.029)"
L511 0.037 0.108 0,217
(1.261) (0.080) (1.099)(0.106)'
-0.098 0,147 0.192 -0.030
(0.071) (0.107) (0.128) (0.040)
#2 0.072 0.055 -0.027 0.003
(0.05 I) (0.058) (Q038) (0.045)
-0.008 -0.004 -0.017 -0.014
(0.006) (0.009) (0.007)'(0.007)t
a 7&43 6.511 5.961 4.293 4.321 4.265
(2.079)" (1.886)" (1.462)" (0.756)" (0.739)" (0.705)"
In L -361.3 -348.9 -342.6 -186.3 -169.7 -165.6
p 16 119 57 17 21 15
QAIO) 16.948t22.947" 26.197" 14.451 14.908 16.64ff
Q(10) &313 3,881 2.884 2.643 2.437 1.492
a is the degrees of freedom parameter in the Studenti distribution. pilisa number of convergence ilerstions.
34TABLE Sb
WEEKLY EXCHANGE RATE GARCH MODELS: C0NDmoNAL VARIANCE EQUATIONS
SAMPLE:1185-2187,itoobe (Pro-Louvre Accord)
V1 + + + t1iC-1i + t21'tI +
+ t4R-,.11 + t,IN,.,,11 +
_________5/DM________ _________5/YEN________
BASICMACNI- DUMMY BASiCMACNI- DUMMY
TUDES VARS TUDES VARS
0.619 0.322 0.184 1.251 0.147 0.511
(0.460)(0J28)°(0.225) (0.748)t(0.536) (0.837)
cs 0.641 0.971 0.949 0.242 0.348 0.521
(0.211)"(0.076)" (0.062)" (0.308)(0.129)" (0.171)"
02 0.194 0.108 0.035 0.302 0.123 0.046
(0.148) (0.099) (0.050) (0.137)'(0.109) (0.060)
-1.278 -0.397 -3.779 -1.559
(1,349) (0.333) (3.997) (1.095)
1.803 0.093 -2.311 -0.999
(0.611)" (0.407) (1.106)'(0.795)
#1 5.660 2.896 12.711 1.061
(3.398)f(1.193)' (7.232)f(O.617)t
#4 -0.295 -0.483 0.718 0.972
(0.235) (0.567) (1.135) (0.793)
-0.147 0.481 0.942 1.389
(0.299) (0-348) (0.622) (0.623)'
0.181 0.159 0.481 0.011
(0.008)"(0.023)" (0.314) (0.413)
InL -119,2 -100.2 -101.9 -103.4 -88.8 -99.1
p 21 17 18 25 24 15
Q,(10) 10.501 11.512 11.024 5.216 5.341 7.532
Q,,(10) 5.048 8.588 8.213 3.672 6.774 2.395
EdeN ns ma ma na ma ns
Standard errors are in parentheses. t denotes aigeificanceatthe 90% level: 'denotes signilicance at the 95% level;
denotes significance at the 99% level, in L is the value of the log likelihood function, p is the number of
convergence iterations, Q is the Box-Pierce Q-etstistic for the standardized residuals, and EdeN denotes whether
any coefficient from tlte Engle and Ng (1992) diagnostic regression indicates that the (lARCH rentrictione are
violated.
35TABLE 4a
DAILY EXCHANGE RATE GARCH MODELS: CONDITIONAL VARIANCE EQUATIONS
SAMPLE: 1/85-12/88 1002 obs
= + + 2trt + •ii+ + t14"I +
+ t41I7I + tM.d +
________$/DM_______ ________S/YEN_______
BASICMAGNI- DUMMY BASICMAGNI- DUMMY
TImES VARS TUDES VARS
0.028 0.069 0.078 0.042 0.034 0.041
(0.008)" (0.022)" (007)" (0.014)(0.018fl(0.014)
re 0.833 0,851 0.832 0.744 0.710 0,688
(0.032)' (0.029)" (0.034)" (0.052)" (0.057)" (0.054)*t
02 0.106 0.083 0.101 0.161 0.166 0.186
(0.027)" (0.022)" (0.026)" (0.042)'(0.044)"(0.046)"
0.237 0270 0.260 0.257 0.199 0.151
(0.100)'(0.094)" (0.096)" (0.107)'(0.094)'(0.082)t
-0.029 -0.023 .0,014 -0.012
(0,162) (0.032) (0.193) (0.034)
-0.198 0.001 .0.190 -0.096
(0.374) (0.024) (0.119)(0.021)'
0.476 0.115 0.112 0.013
(0.192) (0.036)' (0.438) (0.044)
-0.005 0.031 0.118 0.183
(0.037) (0.042) (0.061fl (0.062)+th
-0.002 -0.013 -0.014 -0.001
(0.029) (0.030) (0.032) (0.031)
#6 0.015 0.016 -0.006 -0.007
(0.006)'(0.007)' (0.005) (0.004)t
ii 8.055 7.211 6.891 4.772 4.682 4.401
(1.999)" (1.586)" (1.43 1)" (0.731)" (0694)" (0.593)"
In L -525.1 -497.0 492.8 -374.7 -349.4 -335.6
p 15 22 19 tO 37 21
Q1(20) 17.881 27.354 23.091 28.767t31.014*29.505t
Q1.(20) 30.188j23.881 27.382 14.064 11415 5.657
oisthe degrees or freedom parameter in the Studenl t distribulion. pisthe number of convergence iterations.
36TABLE 4b
WEEKLY EXCHANGE RATE GARCII MODELS: CONDITIONAL VARIANCE EQUATIONS
SAMPLE: 1/85-12/88, 206 obs
2 1)3 ta S — a0 + atvr_/+U2C,j ÷ t R-y-iI + $alIs-,,P+4, P1-,,,s-iI
+ $ + t5 PM,,.1 I + t6 sç1
________51DM_______ ________5/YEN_______
BASICMAGNI- DUMMY BASICMAGNI- DUMMY
TUDES VARS TUDES VARS
0.523 0.029 0.138 1.726 2.481 0.864
(0,332) (0.095)(0.089) (0.921fl(0.809) (0.394)1
0.664 0.959 0.944 0.393 0.295 0.324
(0.178)(0.056) (0.034)1* (0.398)(0.105)1* (0.l22)'
a5 0.147 0.047 0.071 0.184 0.155 0.075
(0.091) (0.044)(0.032)1 (0.069)' (0064)(0.038)
-0.779 -0.559 -2.233 -0.706
(0,259)0* (0.215)0* (0.446)5* (0.411)t
1.324 0.695 -0.586 -1.313
(0.368)" (0.179)1* (1.219)(0.303)
3.412 0.631 4.648 1.005
(2.307)(0.303) (1.416)0* (0.464)
-0.195 -0.044 1.227 0894
(0.178) (0.240) (0.552)1(-539)t
0.039 0.305 0.246 0.895
(0.206) (0.192) (0.281)(0.290)
0.037 0.044 0.139 0.021
(0.024 (0.013)0* (0.241) (0.131)
InF. -199.9 -179.0 -179.3 -188.5 175.0 -172.1
p 18 113 33 20 121 26
Q(10) 6.866 12.711 9,482 10.074 10.384 8.063
Q11(I0) 8.091 3.807 4.955 6.988 11.323 7.634
E&N no no n no no no
Standarderrorsare in parentheses. t denotes significanceatthe 90% level; denotes significanceatthe95% level;
denotes significanceatthe 99%level. In L isthevalueofthe log likelihoodfunction,pis the numberof
convergenceiterations Q.isthe Box-PierceQ-atstinio forthe standardizedresiduals, and E&N denoteswhether
anycoefficient from theEngle andNg (1992) diagnostic regreasionindicatesthat the GARCI-1 restrictionsore
violated,
37TABLE 5
DAiLY EXCHANGE BATE GARCH MODELS; CONDITIONAL VARIANCE EQUATIONS
SAMPLE; 3187-12/91. 1208 obe (Post-Louvre Accord)






























0.465 0.222 0.596 0.103
(0.175)" (0.032)' (0.194)" (0.021)t
0.018 0027 0.016 0.037
(0.040) (0.042) (0.037) (0.038)
0.005 0.001 0.042 0048
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026)(0.027)t
0.008 DM08 0.001 0.001
(0.002)" (0.002)" (0.001) (0.001)
n 10.558 12.723 11.867 5.777 6.218 6.021
(2.672)" (4.020)" (3,644)" (1.174)" (1.366)" (1.281)"
La L -567,2 -546.5 -550.7 -486.4 -462.0 -463.7
'4 11 17 17 15 11 16
Qt(25) 38.114'33.148 33.707 45.218"34.7281-37.963e
Q(25) 24.699 19.677 22.402 19.367 15.204 15.986
itis the de8recs of freedomparameter in the Student a distribution. pisthe number of convergence iterations.
38TABLE Sb
WEEKLY EXCHANGE RATh GARCH MODELS: CONDITIONAL VARIANCE EQUATIONS
SAMPLE: 3/87-12/91, 251 ohs (Post-Louvre Accord)
V1 — %av1_+ u2e1 + $.IC-d+•2 IA-MI+
+ tF',YI + *5IM_,,_I
+
________$/DM_______ ________$!YEN_______
BASICMACNJ- DUMMY BASICMACNI- DUMMY
TUDES VARS T'UDES VARS
0.486 3.593 0.290 0.406 0.035 0.027
(0.212)'(0499)" (0.112)" (0.226)1(0.053) (0056)
a1 0.711 0.730 0.914 0.149 0.886 0.877
(0.126)" (0.125)" (0.038)" (0A18)" (0M44)" (0.051)'
0.095 0.008 0.018 0.071 0.035 0.031
(0.073) (0.034) (0.024) (0.049) (0.025) (0.026)
1.324 0.583 0.250 0.171
(0.501)" (0J37)" (0.194) (0.197)
NA NA NA NA
11.606 0.752 0.666 0.142
(4.566)'(0.442)f (0.351))(0.193)
-0.813 -0.353 -0.286 -0.268
(0.297)"(0.170)' (0.161)1(0219)
-0.058 -0.171 0.241 0.249
(0.322) (0.089)1 (0i41)t(0.155)
0.411 0.051 -0.019 -0.016
(0.150)"(0.019)" (0.011)1 (0.015)
InL -234.5 -208.6 -215.3 -223.1 -202.1 -200.6
p 14 48 64 25 25 28
Q1(10) 13.991 17221f11774 15.152 8.605 10.722
Q,,(j0) 2.086 1L668 12.621 5.948 7.884 9M36
E&N na positive positive its
size biassize bias
Standard errors are in parentheses. t denotes significance at the 90% level; *denotessignificance at the 95% level:
*1 denotes significance at the 99% level, in L isthevalue of the log likelihood function, pisthe number of
convergence iterations, Qisthe Box-Pierce Q..atatiatie for the standardized reeiduala, end E&N denotes whether
any coefficientfrom the Engleand Ng (1992) diagnostic regression indicates that the GARCH restrictions are
violated,
39TABLE 6a
DAILY EXCHANGE RATE GARCH MODELS: COND17IONAL VARIANCE EQUATIONS
SAMPLE: 1/85-1191, 1745 cbs
= + + a2t.1 + + '1'I4!flt21tI +




4, 0.031 0,042 0.042
(0.007)" (0.010)" (0.011)
rs 0.935 0.930 0.829
(0.027)' (0.029)" (0.028)"





















0.111 0.009 0.283 0.036
(0.064)f(0.031) (0. 169)1(0.039)
-0.002 0.013 0.052 0.072
(0.034) (0.035) (0.038) (0.042)f
#5 .0.019 -0.015 0.001 0.005
(0.023) (0.022) (0.021) (0.022)
#6 0.004 0.004 0.0002 0.001
(0.002)'(0.002)' (0.001) (0.001)
9.441 7.838 8.029 5.142 5.327 5.242
(1.561)" (1.324)" (1.435)" (0.667)" (0.689)" (0.669)"
In L -939.5 -923.6 -921.4 -676.3 -651.3 -652.3
p 11 21 18 10 14 14
Q(35) 35.651 34.197 33.610 46.892f38.215 40.624
Q.(35) 46.45663.301" 53,146" 26.104 22.734 22.016
n is the degrees of freedom parameter intheStudent tdtstdbution. p i the number ot convergence iterations.
40TABLE 6b
WEEKLY EXCHANGE RATE GAItCH MODELS: CONDITIONAL VARIANCE EQUATIONS
SAMPLE:1185-12191, 362 ohs
V1 = a3 + a1 V11 + a2e. + $if,..+ tI',IJ+ t,II- I
+ $ + *, IM-,-1I +
________81DM________ ________S/YEN_______
EASICMACN!- DUMMY BASICMAGNI. DUMMY
TUBES VARS RIDES VARS
Cr0 0.394 0.399 0.391 0.544 0.175 1.078
(0.186)'(0.266) (0.313) (0.269) (0.122) (0.224)"
0.732 0.739 0.693 0.663 0.677 0.684
(0.104)" (0.121)" (0.148)" (0.127)" (0.079)1* (0100)"
0] 0.131 0.137 0.156 0.110 0.094 0.166
(0.061)'(0.069)'(0.081)t (0.033)" (0.029)" (0.056)'
-0.174 0.165 -0.204 -1.027
(0103ff(0.035)" (0.181) (0.223)"
NA NA NA NA
0.573 0.317 0.542 0.776
(0.243)'(0.366) (0.691) (0.343)'
#1 -0.087 0.097 '0.096 1.496
(0,287) (0.346) (0.274)(0.445)"
-0.011 0.254 0.669 0.841
(0.239) (0.258) (0.255)'(0.309)"
0.030 0.043 -0.025 0.010
(0.030) (0.038) (0.024) (0.045)
In L -356.6 -348.1 •3454 -330.9 -313.9 -309.5
p 11 48 32 37 52 75
Qjl0) 14.647 13.084 13.531 11.004 6.083 9.681
Q,(l0) 4.511 6.572 4.698 8.001 10.249 4.706
E&N ns na no no us tsr
Standard errorsare in parentheses. tdenotes significance at the 90% level; * denotes significance at the 95% level;
" denotes significance at the 99% level. In L is the valueof thelog likelihood function, p is the number of
convergence iterations.ii the Bnx.Pierve Q-atatiatic forthe standardizedreelduala, sod E&N denotos whether




DOES VOLATILITY CAUSE INTERVENTION OR DOES INTERVENTION CAUSE VOLATILny?
S S S




Explanatory (1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
variable
reported 0.972 0.761 1.378 0.634 1.081 0.923 0.822 0.386
Fed
(magnitude)
reported 1.661 0,978 0.617 0.224 1.213 1.117 0.621 1.674
Fed(0, 1)
reported 1.858 8.198 NA NA 0.185 0.199 NA NA
Bundesbanlc
(magnitude)
reported 1.998 0.621 NA NA 1.630 0.542 NA NA
Ilundesbank
(0.1)
secret 1.376 0.500 8.708 1.059 0.071 0.3493.9201.996
intervention
(magnitude)
secret 1.829 0.610 0.524 0.561 0.278 0.723 0,834 1.025
intervention
(0.1)
reported 1.436 0.253 0.922 0.537 1.471 2.016 0.498 1.376
001(01)
News 0.676 1.443 0.646 0.749 0.739 1.753 1.389 0.806
Interest 1.142 1.021 4.662"1.704 0.217 0.489 1.390 0.764
Rate Spread
The F-statistics pertain to the hypothesis that all lags of r err equal to zero; ICdenotessignificance at the 99%
level. Sample (I)is1/85-2187 (Pee-Louvre Accord); sample (2) is 1/85-12188 (the full sample over which Fed and
Bundeebank data ace available); sample (3) is 3(87-12/91 (Post-Louvre Accord); sample (4) is 1/85-12/91.
42TABLE Th
WEEKLY I3RANOER-CAUSALITY TESTS
DOES VOLATILITY CAUSE INTERVENTION OR DOES INTERVENTION CAUSE VOLATILITY?
S S
RI




Explanatory (I) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
variable
reported 1.098 1.957 1.313 0.590 1.711 1.747 0.843 1.877
Fed
(magnitude)
reported 1.053 1.087 1.662 1.363 1.313 1.717 1.620 1.919
Fed (0.1)
reported 0.814 1.647 NA NA 0.376 1.184 NA NA
Eundesbanlc
(magnitude)
reported 1.303 1.856 NA NA 1.010 1.717 NA NA
Bundesbank
(0,1)
secret 0.454 0.682 2.479 0.373 0.506 0.477 2.5I4 1,551
intervention
(magnitude)




reported1.182 1.729 1.287 0.389 1.910 0.758 1.113 1.136
1101(0.1)
News 0.376 1.127 2.069 0.651 0.881 0.693 1.163 1.834
Interest 1.045 0.669 1.953 0.685 1.685 0.573 1.265
Rate Spread
The F-statistics pertain to the hypothesis that all lags of v are equal to zero; 'denotes eigni licance at the 95% level.
Sample (1) is 1/85-2/87 (Pro-Louvre Accord); sample (2) is 1/85-12/88 (the hill sample over which Feet and
Bundeabanlc data are available); sample (3) is 3/87-12191 (Post-Louvre Accord); sample (4) is 1/85.12(91.
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